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The BAROMETER Is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
+*+*+*+*+*+*+*+ 
"Belng a military leader in our country Is easy compared with other 
nations. The leaderls role is to motivate men to achieve a common 
goal: here, 50% of the leaderls job is already done. Our arguments 
and doubts are not about the goal, which Is survival. Arguments are 
about policies-how to achieve it. Amerlcals doubts in Vietnam, in 
contrast, were about the goal. I look forward to the day when our big 
worry Is to question the goal." 
(As told to Armed Forces Journal by a Deputy of Israel IS Lt. 
Elazar, ARMED FORCES JOURNAL OCTOBER 1973) 
FEATURE: ISRAELIS DEFENSE PHILOSOPHY: WHATIS SO DIFFERENT? 
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Robert McNamara once asked Moshe Dayan that question. Just returned from a vi~o 
Vietnam, Dayan answered: "First you have to pick your enemies.'1 
Former Haganah Commander Yigal Allon has another answer. To compensate for its lack 
of actural depth. Israel has had to create strategic depth. By seizing the initiative, 
carrying the battle to enemy ground, avoiding surprise attack, and making Its wars short 
and decisive. 
ANTICIPATORY COUNTER-ATTACK 
To achieve this, It has relied on pre-emptive attack-although Allon and other Israeli 
leaders prefer to call It "an tlclpatory counter-attack". In the 1956 Sinai Campaign and 
In the 1967 Six Day War, they say, pre-emptive Israeli offensives were justified because 
"it was known for cer~ain an actual invasion was about to take place" and Israel had 
"proof of Its immlnence" through visible concentrations of aggressive enemy forces. (A 
major history of the 1967 War by David Dayan, Israeli Army Broadcasting Service's chief 
correspondent, is titled simply: .IIStrike Firstl") To avoid misjudgement of or over-
_ hasty reaction to enemy actions (and thus, incidentally, risk losing the support of 
free-world public opinion by too pre-emptive an attack), Israel has built up a first-
class intelligence service. Good intelligence also lets Israel wait as long as possible, 
while the enemy concentrates his forces, so that a major part of enemy forces will be 
destroyed quickly when Israel does strike. 
Professor Yehuda Vallach, who teaches Military History at The University of Tel Aviv, 
gave this view of "what ls different": First, welre not tied down to theories and dogma: 
our thinking is open-minded. Second, it's the 'strategy of indirect approach'-doing 
the unexpected, in space, time, and direction. Call it the capability of unconventional 
thinking. In strategy we are students of Liddell Hart. Talis attack at Raffar (the 
breakthrough in 1967, 30 miles northeast of El Arlsh) Is a good example: the last thing 
the Egyptians thought he would do is attack in daylight against their strongest force. 
From these 2 precepts. everything else evolves. I believe the outcome is decided before 
you ever decide to make the right or left hook." (Some time earlier, Armed Forces 
journal had asked a young Israeli paratroop officer attending one of our command and 
staff colleges: "What's different between ours and yours?" He told us, liTo be number one 
here, know the school solution. In Israel, you flunk out if you canlt come up with an 
nrinfnal pla", . II) 
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-2-
Vallach cites a third attribute of the Israeli soldier: his capability for 
independent thinking: "Everybody understands what needs to be done; however complicated 
the plan, privates can carryon after the officers and NCOs are killed." Vallach is 
writing an official history of Israel's armored corps and cites an example from the 
initial 1967 breakthrough on the Golan Heights: "I studied one battalion In detail. 
At the end, 2 tanks achieved the objective." Asked what accounts for that characteristic, 
Vallach says the normal Israeli is sti 11 I ike the American frontiersman: "He doesn't 
like to be pushed around and thinks Independently. Our tank crews come from kibbutzim; 
they're used to working with tractors. If their tank breaks down, they won't walt for 
the recovery crew to catch up and fix it-they'd be insulted If they couldn't get It gol~ 
aga i n on the I r own." 
NO HEBREW WORD FOR "SIR" 
Resourcefulness of the Individual Israeli soldiers is a tradition that goes back to 
the Haganah, as does the I.D.F. spirit of mutual responsibility, trust, and comradeship. 
They explain In larQe Dart I.D.F.'s strIctly functional view of military convention-and the 
fact that Israeli soldiers are hardly world famous for either the frequency or smartness 
of their salutes. A French Colonel, Robert Henriques, wrote some years ago: '~here 
is no Hebrew word for 'Sir'. A soldier genuinely feels himself to be the equal of his 
officer-indeed any officer-yet in battle he accepts military authority without question." 
Bemused by this lack of discipline In the conventional sense, Henriques noted: 
"Officers are often called by their first names, amongst their men, as amongst their 
colleagues ... 1 cannot explain, I cannot begin to understand how or why it works. All my 
own military experience in the British and American armies has taught me that first-class 
discipline in battle depends on good discipline In barracks. Israel's Army seems to 
refute that lesson." 
DON'T. SALUTE: WAVE 
An Israeli salute, In fact, resembles much more of a friendly wave. That may be 
because Israeli officers seem to enjoy not only the respect, but the genuine affection 
of their soldiers. Indeed, AFJ was told that had it not been for so many foreign visitors 
watching Israel's 7 May 25th anniversary parade, soldiers passing in review probably would 
have waved to Golda Meir instead of saluting. (Once past the reviewing stands, many did, 
in fact, wave as they spotted mother, wife or girlfriend.) Yet the units were smart: 
tank and artillery formations were probably the best aligned motorized columns (even on 
Jerusalem's difficult and hilly streets) that AFJ has ever seen. 
THE BIBLE AS A FIELD MANUAL 
Being a young "nation but rich in religious heritage, Israel has other things going 
for it in building esprit de corps and Integrating conscripts into the I.D.F. One of 
them is God. As AFJ learned during 3 weeks in Israel, Jewish schools stress religious 
heritage and Israelis know their Biblical history. Thus, we shouldn't have been surprised 
(but were) to learn that the I.D.F. even uses the Bible as a field manual. Or at least 
as a basic reference. Most Army texts quote the Bible to make a point. It serves as a 
common point of reference, whether for Oriental or Western Jews with their vastly 
different traditions and educational backgrounds. The head of I.D.F. personnel ( a young 
Major General who looks like Dean Martin's twin brother) told AFJ: "That's part of the 
reason wh~ cohesion within our military units is as high as anyone could expect." 
Another factor that makes integration easier: the compulsory pre-military youth ~ 
program of the Gadna, in which all 14-18 year olds participate. By the time a youngster 
enters conscript service he knows the history of Israel, more Importantly how its armed 
forces made his freedom possible, and he's tasted the pioneer challenge in field camp-outs. 
Still another factor: military service is the most important factor in getting Integrated 
into one's community. Though no one put it this way, it was clear to AFJ that bad soldiers 
or really disgruntled reservists would have a hard time being accepted as good citizens. 
Perhaps it's a side effect of having had to fight for one's life 3 times in 25 years: 
more than 3% of the population was killed or wounded in the War of Independence, 7 times 
the rate of U.S. casualties in the Revolutionary War. And since the 1967 cease fie, 1.1% 
of the population has been killed or wounded, 7 times . the casualties America sustained in 
Vietnam, almost twice the number we suffered in World War I I. 
Officials say it is becoming easier now to imbue youngsters with the I.D.F. spirit, 
since more and more conscripts are Israeli-born (71% in 1970 compared with only 36% In 1966). 
Other facets of I.D.F. contrast sharply with most western nations. The Israeli 
Army, when you add it all up, is a very different breed of cat, in structure as well as 
strategy. 
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ACCENT ON YOUTH 
Israel's military leaders are as young as their nation. As one retired officer 
quipped to AFJ last spring: '~e're finally a mature nation. Welve seen a chief of 
staff die naturally." (He was referring to Lt Gen Yaakov Dori, who died last January 
at 73. Dori fought with the British Armyls Jewish Legion In WWI and headed the Haganah 
In the mld-1940s before leading Israeli forces, although seriously ill, in the 1948 War 
of Independence.) 
There has never been a chief of staff over 50 and most have been in their early 
forties. The current Chief of Staff, Lt Gen "Dado" Elazar, is 48. At the time of AFJls 
visit to Israel last spring, his 3 area commanders were 45, 46 and 47, respectively (and 
one of them has since retired). Maj Gen Motl Hod, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force 
joked wi th AFJ (just before he too ret I red I n May) that at age 47 he was lithe oldest 
pilot in the Air Force." The average LA.F. pilot Is only 26 and most LA.F. instructors 
are only 22-23, having already served 2 to 3 years in combat squadron. 
RELATIVELY FEW SENIOR OFFICERS 
Another striking characteristic of I.D.F. Is its low overhead senior-ranking personnel. 
With less than 40 general officers, Israel has one-third the number of U.S. generals or 
admirals, in proportion to the size of Its forces. Only 2% of all I.D.F. officers are 
colonels or generals, vs. 6% in the U.S. The U.S. has almost half again as many majors 
and lieutenant colonels, 31% of officer strength vs. 21% in Israel. Almost four-fifths 
of I.D.F. officers are lieutenants and captains, whereas they make up less than two-thirds 
of the U.S. officer corps. 
DUAL JOBS ~ LOW OVERHEAD 
Overhead is low in other arenas as well. For one thing, the Ministry of Defense is 
small by any standards. There are only about 2,000 people in it, including those who 
handle veterans affairs, museums and archives. I.D.F. has roughly 1 civilian for every 
6 people on active duty in uniform, less than one-third the civilian overhead of U.S. 
defense forces and only one-sixth of Great Britain's. 
There are several reasons Israel can get by with such a low ratio of civilian-to-
military personnel. One is that most of its defense industry is government-owned and to 
some extent "self-policing;" management is largely made up of reserve officers who not 
only understand lithe system" but go on active duty regularly to see how well (or poorly) 
their equipment works. Another reason is that such a high percentage of Israeli citizens 
are in the Army, one way or another. Roughly 13% of Israel IS population is either on 
active military service or in the ready reserve, 10 times as many (about 1.4%) as in the 
U.S. Thus, I.D.F. gets at least the part-time service of 10 times as many people per 
year in relation to population, and 4 times as many comparing defense budgets to gross 
national product. 
I.D.F. overhead is low in other ways. Because Israel plans for short wars, many 
senior personnel serve in dual roles. The peacetime chief of I.D.F. training becomes a 
division commander in the case of war l so does the head of armor. A more dramatic 
example: in the Six Day War, Air Froce training stopped for 10 days while instructor 
pilots flew combat sorties; thereafter, they flew 1 combat sortie in the War of Attrition 
for every 2 training flights. 
LEADERSHIP AND MEDALS 
Another aspect of I.D.F. operations worth noting is the large number of officers 
wounded, but the relatively small number decorated, compared with other countries. In 
the Six Day War, for .Instance. Israeli officers account for about 20% of those klJled in 
action, 51% of those cited for valor by the Chief of Staff. By contrast, U.S. officers 
in VIetnam accounted for 9% of all Army men wounded, but more than one-third of all 
those decorated (based on an unpublished AFJ survey for the peak years of 1968 and 1969, 
using Purple Heart and Silver Star awards as a criterion. The ratio is similar to a 
smaller WWII data sample, in which U.S. officers accounted for 7% of the wounds but 29% 
of the Silver Stars.) On this basis, the U.S. officer stands close to a 40% greater 
chance of being recognized as a hero than his Israeli counterpart, relative to exposure 
to enemy fire. 
About 23% of all Israeli casualties in 1967 were unit commanders, compared with 
international experience averaging around 10%. A major factor behind this high casualty 
rate is that I.D.F. armor doctrine, for instance, encourages commanders to stay alert to 
the situation by attacking with their heads out of the turret Instead of having their 
tanks "buttoned-up". Halm Herzog, a former head of military intelligence who is now a 
popular commentator on military affairs, sums It up this way: liThe secret of Israelis 
success was in the fighting man (but) above all in the IFollow-me l leadership which has 
become the hallmark of I . O. F. There are no barl soldler~ it I~ commonl v said: therp 
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There are, incidentally, no monuments in Israel to Individual heroes-only to units. 
And there are no monuments to victories, just to the men who fell. 
RESERVE CONTRIBUTION-AND CASUALTIES 
Except for the Air Force and Intelligence Corps, Israel, like Sweden, relies for the 
bulk of its combat power on reserve forces, or Its "Army on leave." (Former Chief of Staff 
Vigael Vadin prefers an alternative description: "Regular soldiers who happen to be on 
leave 11 months of the year".) In 1967, reservists accounted for 72% of those killed in 
action and 55% of those decorated for bravery. Reservists serve until age 55, women 
without children until they are 34. 
Israel's heavy reliance on rapdlly mobilized reserve units also accounts to some 
extent for the fact that "people costs" are a small fraction of Its defense budget, 
compared with other countries. Military pay and allowance take up only 10% of I.D.F. ~ 
expenditures, but 29% In the U.S. When other "people costs" are added In for housing, 
subsistence, etc., Israel runs even less, under 20% of the defense budget vs. 56% in 
the U.S. (and 46% for Australia, 50% in the U.K., 70% in Canada). 
PEOPLE COSTS ARE LOW 
Part of the way Israel's reliance on reserve forces holds people costs down, and thus 
frees money for better equipment, is that is conscripts are not paid much. A private 
gets less than $10 a month for pocket money. The conscript who volunteers for extra 
training and rises to captain while still on his obigatory (or "national service") active 
duty tour gets only $12 a month, whereas his career counterpart earns $255 to $287. Even 
for senior officers, pay scales are low by international standards: an Israeli full 
colonel earns about $450 a month, less than a fourth of his American counterpart (roughly 
$1,800, compared with around $1,225 in the U.K. or Sweden and $1,600 in Australia). The 
low pay scales are compensated for in part by preferential treatment on home mortgages, 
an important fringe benefit given the extraordinary cost of housing in Israel. Moreover, 
Israelis claim that their pound (at about 4 IL to the dollar) has about the same 
purchasing power in Israel as a dollar does in the U.S. (although after 3 weeks there, 
AFJ editors couldnlt find what part of Israel they were referring to). On this basis, 
however, military pay scales would not seem so low. 
One "allowance" senior field grade officers do get, not found elsewhere; a personal 
car and free transportation. A colonel gets a Plymouth Valiant; a lieutenant colonel 
(and "some majors", usually intelligence types) get a smaller Israeli-made car (generally 
held in scorn as a "leaky but motorized sardine tin.ell ). An allowance senior officers do 
not enjoy: general officers have no "enlisted aides" to help out with household or 
entertaining chores. They do have drivers-but the drivers drive and serve as bodyguards, 
not bartenders. 
RETIRED COMPENSATION 
Retirement benefits are generous by Israelis standards, up to a maximum of 75% of 
onels last active duty salary (augmented by periodic cost-of-living hikes). Retirement 
credits generally add up to 2% of onels last pay for each year of active service, 3% 
for each year of submarine, flight or parachute duty. Moreover, a soldier can renounce 
25% of his retirement pension and get instead a lump sum equal to the actuarial compen-
sation of the amount he has renounced. 
Most Israelis enter service at age 18 and are eligible to retire after 25 years, when 
only 43. Thus, retirees are young enough to begin new careers in a country whose 
industries and economy are growing faster than new immigrants can be brought in to fill 
all the available jobs. As Maj Gen Arik Sharon told AFJ, "Those who choose military 
careers should think in 2 circles of life." Sharon, for instance, somehow found time to 
get a law degree on his own time in a crowded and brilliant career. Every Israeli officer 
sooner or later gets a turn for university studies of his choice. (Sharon studied Middle 
East history under this program, Haj Gen Israel Tal studied philosophy). 
THE SECRET WEAPON: WOMEN 
The I.D.F. is also unique In the extent to which it relies on women. Military service 
is compulsory for women as well as men, though women serve only 20 months instead of 36. 
At one front-line brigade headquarters AFJ visited, 30% of the staff was female; at 
another, more remote one, 20%. They fill most clerical and communications billets. One 
commander told AFJ, liThe secret of our Army Is the girls. It IS much more comfortable to 
get an order over the radio from a woman." But as a senior general reminded AFJ: "We 
say we are fighting to defend our women, so we donlt put them on the front line." 
(ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, OCTOBER, 1973) 
